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INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY AND PRIMARY RULES
OF OBLIGATION: AN APPLICATION TO ACID RAIN
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, the United Nations International Law Commission
(ILC) released its first report-"International Liability for Injuri-
ous Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by Interna-
tional Law" (Report on International Liability).' This report out-
lines a set of principles for the eventual codification of regimes of
liability which would bind countries in the same manner that vari-
ous legal liabilities now bind individuals within a country. In an
arrangement to be defined by the countries themselves through ac-
tual practice as well as through negotiated principles, a national
government would be liable for the acts of individuals within its
borders when those acts have extraterritorial effects.2 Within this
framework, the term "liability" encompasses not only the duty to
compensate an injured party under certain circumstances, but also
the duty to take reasonable measures for the prevention of injury.'
The emerging theory of liability discussed in the Report on In-
ternational Liability is especially well-suited to dealing with
problems arising in the environmental context, because it focuses
on internal acts which may cause damage externally. This Note
will first examine the principles of international liability contained
in the Report against the backdrop of existing international law,
and then apply those principles to a current international environ-
mental dispute: the conflict between the United States and Canada
regarding acid rain.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY
In recent years, harmful environmental consequences of human
Preliminary Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/334 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2]; U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/334/Add.1 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Preliminary Report: Chapter 3]; U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/334/Add.2 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Preliminary Report: Chapter 4].
" See Preliminary Report: Chapter 4, supra note 1, para. 60, at 6.
' Id. para. 26, at 14.
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activities have been the object of increasing concern worldwide."
One result has been mounting pressure on national legal systems to
develop viable methods of bringing such potentially harmful activi-
ties under control.' However, attempts to grapple with environ-
mental problems frequently have been hindered because the harm-
ful activity is far removed, in time and distance, from the resulting
damage. 6
The accelerating demand for new ways to limit environmental
damage promises to have a significant impact on the development
of appropriate rules of liability under international law. Conflicts
between countries caused by transfrontier pollution are developing
with increasing frequency.' In response to these conflicts, a number
of international instruments have recognized that the assignment
of some degree of responsibility to source countries is an essential
precondition to the control of transfrontier pollution.8 As postu-
lated by the ILC, "[a] State within whose jurisdiction such an in-
jury or danger is caused is not justified in refusing its cooperation
upon the ground that the cause of the danger was or is not, within
its knowledge or control."9 Similarly, Principles 21 and 22 of the
seminal Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment affirm
the responsibility of countries to take measures to ensure that con-
duct within their borders does not cause harm elsewhere, and to
I A recently published United Nations document recognizes "the urgent necessity of in-
tensifying the efforts at the global, regional, and national levels to protect [the environ-
ment]." Nairobi Declaration on the State of the Worldwide Environment, U.N. Doc. UNEP/
GC.10/INF.5 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 676 (1982).
' See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980); Clean Air Act of 1970, § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. IV 1980) (legislative
declarations of purpose to protect environment).
0 "[Tihe intrinsic difficulties of the subject [of transboundary pollution] . . . will continue
to have impact ... in the political realm." Munton, Acid Rain and Basic Politics, 10 AL-
TERNATIvES 21, 22 (1981).
" See generally Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation, 2
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1972); Note, Economic Implications of European Transfrontier Pollution:
National Prerogative and Attribution of Responsibility, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 519
(1981).
' See, e.g., United Nations: Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution,
U.N. Doc. ECE/HLM.1/R.1 (1979), - U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979); Dec-
laration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 48/14 & Corr.1 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Stockholm Declaration]; Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE HELD AT
HELSINKI 484 (1966); Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938);
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
* Preliminary Report: Chapter 4, supra note 1, para. 60, at 6.
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work towards a regime of compensation where such preventive
measures fail to eliminate the danger of harm.10
While the responsibility for preventive measures alone may be
gaining some measure of acceptance, countries have been reluctant
to accept a "direct linkage" 1' between such a duty and questions of
compensatory liability. As a rule, countries have preferred to allow
individual claims arising from transfrontier pollution damage to be
settled at the private level. 2 This cautious attitude, along with the
multifaceted nature of the transfrontier pollution problem, has re-
sulted in the widespread perception that remedies at public inter-
national law are poorly defined and "needlessly circuitous."'
Until recently, transfrontier pollution has received attention
chiefly with regard to pollutant sources which were located along
international borders.' Nevertheless, in recent times, significant
harmful effects have been detected from pollutants released at dis-
tances so great as to render the source unidentifiable. 5 To the ex-
10 Principle 21
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the princi-
ples of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursu-
ant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that ac-
tivities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of other areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
Principle 22
States shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding liability
and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage
caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas be-
yond their jurisdiction.
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 8, at 1420.
" Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 32nd Session, 35 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) para. 140, at 366, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Int'l
L. Comm'n 32nd Session].
" See McCaffrey, Pollution of Shared Natural Resources: Legal and Trade Implications,
71 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 56, 60 (1977); Hoffman, State Responsibility in International
Law and Transboundary Pollution Injuries, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 509 (1976).
11 McCaffrey, Transboundary Pollution Injuries: Jurisdictional Considerations in Pri-
vate Litigation Between Canada and the United States, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 191, 193
(1973). See also Bleicher, supra note 7, at 10-15.
" See, e.g., Lake Lanoux Case (Fr. v. Spain), Arbitral Tribunal, 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
281 (1957), reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156 (Covington & Burling trans. 1959); Read,
The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1963 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 213; Handl, International Legal Per-
spective on the Conduct of Abnormally Dangerous Activities in Frontier Areas: The Case
of Nuclear Plant Siting, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 15-16 (1978) (noting a dispute over liability for
damage in Switzerland caused by an explosion at a munitions factory in Italy, located five
kilometers from the Italian-Swiss border).
" See, e.g., A. Altshuller & G. McBean, Second Report of the United States-Canada Re-
search Consultation Group on the Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants 6-11 (Nov. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Research Consultation Group Report]; INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMIS-
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tent that this phenomenon is becoming increasingly common-
place,"6 the international community may witness the onset of a
new class of legal disputes which are beyond the capacity of pri-
vate law to redress. Moreover, certain requirements within national
legal systems themselves may indicate that a settlement at the
governmental level is the only alternative to a host of uncompen-
sated injuries.1"
Mr. Robert Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur to the ILC,
notes that existing agreements assigning liability in advance, as
well as post-hoc settlements, "are almost always silent as to their
relationship with customary law." ' This silence would appear to
result from countries' distrust of the ability of existing legal doc-
trine to produce a workable settlement with respect to unforeseen
future circumstances, and from their fear of the potential effect
which a settlement with full precedential value could have on the
scope of their sovereignty. Some critics suggest that such arrange-
ments will always be peripheral to international legal doctrine.1 "
Nevertheless, each new governmental level settlement adds to a
growing body of persuasive legal authority. Since customary inter-
national law embodies the common assumptions underlying state
practice,20 it could be argued that a country's submission to any
SION, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY (Oct. 1980), reported in [3
Current Report] INT'L ENV'T. REP. (BNA) No. 12, at 543-44 (Dec. 10, 1980).
18 Harmful effects of long-range transfrontier pollution have been observed in Europe and
in North America. Research Consultation Group Report, supra note 15, at 3.
17 One example of such a procedural hurdle to private remedies is demonstrated in the
Trail Smelter dispute. Although the conflict was never brought to trial, it appears that the
courts of British Columbia, the only courts having jurisdiction over the pollution source,
would have dismissed a nuisance action on the basis of a common law rule of venue known
as the local action rule. This rule was first established by the House of Lords in British
South Africa Company v. Companhia de Mocanbique, [1893] A.C. 602. It dictates that ac-
tions which directly concern land be brought in the forum where the land is situated. It was
largely because of this jurisdictional obstacle that the dispute eventually proceeded to arbi-
tration. See Read, supra note 14, at 222-23; see generally McCaffrey, supra note 13.
Is Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 1, para. 27, at 14. See Compensation to
Japanese for Damage Resulting from Nuclear Tests, 32 DEP'T ST. BULL. 90-91 (1955)
(United States compensates Japan, ex gratia, for damage to Japanese fishermen resulting
from radioactive fallout from nuclear tests).
", See Int'l L. Comm'n 32nd Session, supra note 11, para. 140, at 366; cf. McCaffrey,
supra note 12 (recent examples of transfrontier pollution disputes and private law reme-
dies). In this respect it should be noted that, so long as transfrontier pollution damage oc-
curs which is not traceable to a private source, there should be a place for solutions at the
government level.
"0 "C]ertain international practices have been found to be reasonable and wise in the
conduct of foreign relations, in considerable measure the result of a balancing of interests.
Such practices have attained the stature of accepted principles or norms and are recognized
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regime or settlement marks the implicit recognition of some legal
obligation. In this respect, Mr. Quentin-Baxter asserts that "[e]ven
informal guidelines . . . cannot, despite all disclaimers, be devoid
of legal significance."21
The right of sovereign countries to be protected from, or com-
pensated for, harm occurring within their borders and caused by
activity within the territory of another sovereign has been consid-
ered in a growing number of documents concerning international
legal relations.22 The more definite this international consensus
becomes, the more compelling the need will be to manifest it in the
form of new legal rules.23 This right of nations has been described
as a "natural prolongation of sovereignty,"2 4 analogous to a coastal
country's partial extension of sovereignty over its continental
shelf.2" In practice, the "prolongation" of sovereignty becomes a re-
striction on the sovereignty of one's neighbors. Widespread uncer-
tainty as to the boundaries of national sovereignty will continue to
present a major challenge of the technological age to international
law.
In this regard the ILC began its effort to codify principles of
international liability in 1973. The stated goal was to produce a set
of principles which would "promote the construction of regimes to
regulate without recourse to prohibition, the conduct of any partic-
ular activity which is perceived to entail actual or potential danger
of a substantial nature and to have transnational effects."2" Mr.
Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur for the international liability
work group, has completed three reports on the subject.2 7 The ILC,
as international law or practice." 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1963).
" Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 1, para. 8, at 4. The legal significance
of such guidelines, however, obviously depends on the extent to which the country espousing
the guidelines actually observes them.
11 See supra note 8. For an analysis of this "overriding proposition," see Bleicher, supra
note 7, at 28-30.
11 "At some point.., the tacit and explicit elements of State practice must harden into
new legal rules." Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 1, para. 8, at 4.
24 Id. para. 27, at 14.
" Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (adopted by the Law of the Sea Conference at its 18th plenary
meeting).
20 Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 1, para. 9, at 4. The Third Report's
"Schematic Outline" defines the scope of the topic as covering "[a]ctivities within the terri-
tory or control of a State which give rise or may give rise to loss or injury to persons or
things within the territory or control of another State." Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its 34th Session, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 179, U.N.
Doc. A/37/10 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Int'l L. Comm'n 34th Session].
17 Preliminary Report: Chapters 1-4, supra note 1.
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sitting as a whole, considered the contents of these reports during
its Thirty-second, Thirty-third, and Thirty-fourth sessions. 8 The
Special Rapporteur's reports and the ILC commentary comprise a
skeletal outline of the international liability theory.
Mr. Quentin-Baxter explains that the concept of liability of
countries springs primarily from a duty of due care."' Nevertheless,
the range of remedies available within the framework of the Re-
port on International Liability goes beyond the conventional stan-
dard of due care. As suggested by the title of the Report, "Interna-
tional Liability for . . . Acts Not Prohibited . . .," the theory's
most innovative aspect is the notion that a country should be able
to continue allowing certain activities, 30 even though the activities
prove deleterious to a neighboring country, provided that the per-
mitting country makes arrangements to compensate the neighbor-
ing country for the damage caused.31 Primary rules of obligation
would dictate that a source country take reasonable measures to
protect the receiving country from further harm and, at the same
time, that it compensate the receiving country for that damage
which continues to occur.2 Under certain circumstances then,
Second Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts
Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/346 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Second Report: Chapters 1 & 2]; U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/346/Add.1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Second Report: Chapter 3]; U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/346/Add.2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Sec-
ond Report: Chapter 4].
Third Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts
Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360 & Corr. 1 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Third Report].
Note: Mr. Quentin-Baxter's Third Report is not available to the writer at this time. This
Note's assessment of the Third Report is based on the ILC's summary of and commentary
on the report contained in its 34th Session report, supra note 26.
s Int'l L. Comm'n 32nd Session, supra note 11; Report of the International Law Commis-
sion on the Work of its 33rd Session, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) 337, U.N. Doc. A/36/10
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Int'l L. Comm'n 33rd Session]; Int'l L. Comm'n 34th Session,
supra note 26.
19 Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 1, para. 16, at 8. "[Tlhe main purpose
of the Special Rapporteur's emphasis on the duty of care was to strengthen the linkage
between the present topic and the classical rules of international law." Int'l L. Comm'n 33rd
Session, supra note 28, para. 174, at 341.
30 Those activities, as suggested in the Report's title, include "acts not prohibited by in-
ternational law."
3' "The primary aim" of the Report on International Liability is to promote the regula-
tion of activities which may cause transfrontier injuries, "without recourse to prohibition."
Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 1, para. 9, at 5.
32 Id. para. 26, at 14. The ILC's attempts to codify international liability principles are a
"direct response" to the call of Stockholm Declaration Principle 22, supra note 8, to develop
the law of compensation and liability. Second Report: Chapter 4, supra note 27, para. 91, at
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compensation may be in order even though the compensating
country's conduct, viewed as a whole, is entirely without fault.
The impetus behind international liability principles, in their
most basic formulation, is summed up in the maxim "sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas." s The twin focus of the maxim illustrates
the essence of the problem: the right to use one's own territory
must be balanced against the obligation to respect the rights of the
owners of neighboring territories. The second half of the maxim,
"not to harm your neighbor," is the basis upon which the restric-
tion on sovereignty must be measured. When applied within the
modern context of due diligence, this restriction must be revised to
require "not to unduly harm your neighbor." The Special Rap-
porteur acknowledges that a concern for equitable rights must be
tempered with pragmatism; 4 it is no more plausible for one party
to have absolute safety from harm than it is for the other party to
have total freedom of action. Thus, one of the most significant ad-
vantages of the Report on International Liability will be its capac-
ity to balance all relevant interests.35 "Sic utere tuo . . ." can no
longer be an absolute prohibition, but must contain the reciprocal
warning: "Expect to be free of harm only to the extent that your
safety does not unduly interfere with your neighbor's freedom."
The Report on International Liability framed the theory in
terms of primary rules of obligation between countries, rather than
the secondary rules of state responsibility outlined by the ILC in
recent reports. 86 This primary obligation attaches as a result of any
potentially harmful activity, regardless of whether damage actually
occurs,37 and it must be fulfilled in order to avoid liability for
wrongful conduct.38 In contrast, secondary rules are triggered only
'3 Preliminary Report: Chapter 3, supra note 1, para. 38, at 6. The phrase means "use
your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1238 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The maxim has been characterized by the ILC as "a neces-
sary ingredient of any legal system." Int'l L. Comm'n 32nd Session, supra note 11, para.
135, at 364.
" "If there were an obligation to avoid all transboundary harm ... the restriction upon a
State's freedom of action could be little less than paralyzing." Second Report: Chapters 1 &
2, supra note 27, para. 36, at 11; see also Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 1,
para. 27, at 14; Int'l L. Comm'n 32nd Session, supra note 11, para. 141, at 366.
31 See infra text accompanying note 129.
" See Int'l L. Comm'n 32nd Session, supra note 11, at 59-69 (draft articles on state
responsibility).
' See supra note 26 (definition of scope).
"States discharge their duty of care, and ensure that they are not exposed to charges of
wrongful conduct." Int'l L. Comm'n 32nd Session, supra note 11, para. 136, at 364.
1983]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 13:111
by wrongful conduct.39 Thus, a secondary obligation may be trig-
gered regardless of the actual occurrence of harm, while the pri-
mary obligation "insists that liability be assessed with reference to
[the possibility of] injurious consequences. "40 The ILC set out to
define the two topics on separate planes so that the primary rules
do not derogate from the secondary rules of state responsibility.41
The ILC observed in 1973 that "a joint examination of the two
subjects could only make both of them more difficult to grasp.' 42
The limitations on a regime restricted to rules of secondary lia-
bility as a device for preventing transfrontier environmental dam-
age are readily apparent. Activities which may not have been de-
fined as wrongful, and consequently, are beyond the pale of a
secondary regime, may nonetheless cause substantial damage.'3
Thus, there would be a gap between a country's interests (includ-
ing safety from harm) and its neighbors' obligations (mere redress
for wrongful conduct) which would become "of great practical sig-
nificance" in a technological age."
A number of observers have predicted the eventual use of strict
liability principles in transfrontier pollution settlements.45 The
S Secondary rules are "concerned with ... the legal consequences of failure to fulfill
obligations established by 'primary' rules." Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of its 25th Session, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 8, U.N. Doc. A/9010/Rev. 1
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Int'l L. Comm'n 25th Session].
40 Preliminary Report: Chapter 3, supra note 1, para. 47, at 11. The ILC explains that
"the principal [i.e., 'secondary,'] rule prohibits an activity that is wrongful; the subsidiary
[i.e., 'primary,'] rule allows that activity to continue while it complies with conditions that
avoid wrongfulness." Int'l L. Comm'n 33rd Session, supra note 28, para. 190, at 347. Thus,
obligations under the theory of international liability are primary in that they are triggered
earlier in a sequence of events, but in the sense that they are "auxiliary rules of a mainly
procedural character," they could be regarded as secondary. Id. para. 171, at 340.
4, Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 1, para. 19, at 11; Int'l L. Comm'n
32nd Session, supra note 11, para. 133, at 363.
" Int'l L. Comm'n 25th Session, supra note 39, para. 38, at 7.
43 In this respect, Mr. Quentin-Baxter notes that "[tihe equipoise of the two halves of
Stockholm Principle 21 [calling for control measures and for compensatory measures where
reasonable control measures fail] evokes a balancing of interests that cannot be attained in
terms of the simple dichotomy between right and wrong." Second Report: Chapter 3, supra
note 27, para. 67, at 18.
4 Preliminary Report: Chapter 4, supra note 1, para. 54, at 2.
" See Int'l L. Comm'n 32nd Session, supra note 11, para. 142, at 366-67; J. SCHNEIDER,
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT 170 (1979); see generally Goldie, Liability for
Damage and the Progressive Development of International Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
1189 (1965).
See also Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
done, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762; Vienna Convention on Civil Liability
for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature, May 21, 1963, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 727 (1963).
Each of these conventions provides for absolute liability for a signatory nation which causes
118
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Preliminary Report suggests that, with increasing awareness and
articulation on the part of countries concerning the demands of an
age of interdependence, "the standard of care that they owe to
each other may rise." '46 This modified standard will mandate not
only protective measures by a source country, but also, in certain
cases, it will require compensation for such harm that reasonable
preventive measures fail to avert.4 7 The advantage of such a flex-
ible standard is that it eschews absolute prohibitions s and it
avoids "the rigidity, and the exclusive focus on compensation, ...
of a regime of strict liability.""9 The goal of countries under this
standard always must be "to reconcile the widest possible freedom
of action with respect for the rights of others. '50
The ILC's work in the area of international liability is intended
primarily to aid in the formulation of regimes designed to protect
against actual or potential danger, and as a secondary aim, to aid
in the determination of the amount of liability after damage has
occurred.51 The emphasis on regulating future conduct reflects the
recognition that a focus on prevention may be more important in
the field of environmental protection than in any other regulatory
endeavor. 2 For the purposes of exploring the applicability of inter-
national liability principles, however, an after-the-fact setting of-
fers the advantage of a more tangible and easily circumscribed set
of events.53
III. CANADA'S ACID RAIN PROBLEM
The current controversy over the extent of United States re-
sponsibility for Canada's acid rain problem offers a useful testing
ground for international liability principles." As will be seen, the
primary obligation consists of three duties: a duty of consultation,
one of prevention, and one of compensation. The application of
damage to another nation under specified circumstances.
" Preliminary Report: Chapter 4, supra note 1, para. 55, at 2.
, Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 1, para. 26, at 14.
" Id. para. 9, at 4-5.
" Second Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 27, para. 6, at 3; see also Second Report:
Chapter 3, supra note 27, para. 46, at 4-5.
Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 1, para. 9, at 4-5.
Id. para. 9, at 5.
, One commentator has remarked that "[ilt is also becoming widely recognized that this
planet is gravely endangered, and that its rapidly accelerating degradation is reaching a
point of no return. .. " J. SCHNmE, supra note 45, at 4.
"S See id. at 153.
See generally Research Consultation Group Report, supra note 15.
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this first duty, that of consultation, will determine the need for the
latter duties. Similarly, the execution of the prevention phase will
determine whether there is a need for compensation.
Since acid rain has only recently been recognized as a threat, the
nature of the obligations involved is just beginning to be brought
into focus. The United States-Canada issue fits into the new legal
relationship envisioned by the Report on International Liability,5
wherein the recognition of danger triggers a mutual obligation to
work towards an agreement regarding the nature of the danger and
the necessary measures to be taken; in other words, to delineate
the "natural prolongation of sovereignty."56
Acid rain is a phenomenon which is particularly likely to cause
damage on an international scale, because it is formed in the upper
atmosphere, where it may be transported over continental dis-
tances.5 1 In a manner only partially understood,5 8 sulfur dioxide
and nitrogen oxide5 emissions are dispersed into the atmosphere
and transformed into sulfates and nitric acids, which return to the
earth in rain and snow or by a process of dry deposition.60
Acidification of a local environment is a cumulative process, and
its effects may go unnoticed in its early stages. 1 Areas such as
eastern Canada, which are relatively low in natural buffering
agents, are particularly vulnerable to damage. 2 Lakes undergo
gradual acidification until their buffering capacities are surpassed,
and then suddenly become "biological deserts." 63 Acidification of
" Preliminary Report: Chapter 4, supra note 1, para. 60, at 5.
"See Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 1, para. 27, at 14.
57 See generally Wetstone, Air Pollution Control Laws in North America and the Prob-
lem of Acid Rain and Snow, 10 ENvTm. L. REP. (ENvTL L. INST.) 50,001 (1980); Research
Consultation Group Report, supra note 15.
"Wetstone, supra note 57; Research Consultation Group Report, supra note 15.
"One of the major obstacles to the rapid advance of scientific knowledge about [acid rain]
has been the need to integrate theory, data, and methods from diverse areas of physics,
chemistry, engineering, meteorology, limnology, agricultural science, and numerous more
specialized fields." Munton, supra note 6, at 21-22.
"Sulfur dioxide is currently recognized as the more significant component. Since the acid
formation process for sulfur is better understood, most proposed remedial measures have
focused on this component. See Wetstone, supra note 57, at 50,019.
" For the purposes of this Note, all three phenomena will be referred to as "acid rain."
See id. at 50,002.
" Wetstone, supra note 57, at 50,001-05.
" Id. at 50,002; United States-Canada Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Pollu-
tion: Strategies Development and Implementation-Interim Report 15 (Feb. 1981) (supplied
by G. Rejhon, Environment Counsellor, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C.).
" Munton, supra note 6, at 23. The actual level of acidity of the water may be less dam-
aging to an ecosystem than the resultant chemical release of other toxic agents. Wetstone,
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soil eventually leaches out nutrients, resulting in reduced produc-
tivity for forests and crops.64 Most researchers have concluded that
efforts to repair the damage cannot realistically hope to restore the
original chemical balance. 65 In view of these problems, the only so-
lution appears to be a reduction in sulfur and nitrogen emissions at
the source.6 6 Nevertheless, the poor understanding of the process
by which acid precipitation is formed, along with the great dis-
tances over which it may be carried, has hampered efforts to ad-
dress the problem at all organizational levels.
The long range transport of pollutants which cause acid rain has
made the problem one of continental dimensions.68 A joint United
States-Canadian research group has found that emissions in the
United States cause approximately one half of the acid rain in
eastern Canada, while emissions in Canada add negligible amounts
to the problem in the United States. 9 To the extent that the dis-
persion of acid rain flows in a single direction, the dispute between
the United States and Canada will be brought within the Report
on International Liability's "new legal relationship.
'7 0
A. The Duty of Consultation
"The regime of reasonable care . ..might . . . include obliga-
tions to collect and furnish information, to seek agreement upon
methods of construction or operating procedures or tolerable levels
of contamination, and to provide guarantees of reparation ....
During the period of uncertainty preceding some agreement, the
supra note 57, at 50,002; I. VAN Lm, Acm RAmN AND INITRNATIONAL LAw 15-30 (1981).
64I. VAN LIER, supra note 63, at 15-30.
The liming of lakes and forests has met with little, if any, success in restoring lost
productivity. Wetstone, supra note 57, at 50,002-03; I. VAN Lma, supra note 63, at 30-32.
See [4 Current Report] INT'L ENV'T RFP. (BNA) No. 3, at 703-04 (Mar. 11, 1981) (rec-
ommendations of National Commission on Air Quality); Wetstone, supra note 57, at 50,019.
It should be noted that a large part of acid-causing emissions in the United States is
produced by electrical power plants, which are subject to a high degree of government con-
trol at the state and regional levels. A reduction in emissions, then, is a matter particularly
suited to a broad response at the governmental level. See supra text accompanying note 19.
See generally Wetstone, supra note 57, at 50,003-15.
Acid rain has been called "the worst environmental problem [Canada has] ever had to
face." Munton, supra note 6, at 21.
" Research Consultation Group Report, supra note 15, at 1.
70 As the Special Rapporteur explains: "[wihere a State ... reasonably believes that it is
exposed to a substantial danger, arising beyond its own borders from the acts or omissions
of other States, there is a new legal relationship which obliges the States concerned to at-
tempt in good faith to arrive at an agreed conclusion .. Preliminary Report: Chapter 4,
supra note 1, para. 60, at 5.
7' Preliminary Report: Chapters 1 & 2, supra note 1, para. 26, at 14.
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primary obligation first must be concerned with bringing disparate
views into a unified focus. 72 As stated by the ILC: "[tihe criterion
of 'harm' could be regarded as a variable which States have a duty
to define or quantify. . . ., In view of the sparse documentation
of long-range environmental damage by acid rain, this inquiry
should focus at the outset on the amount of time which will be
necessary, and that which will be available, in which to respond to
the threat of environmental damage.7" As between the United
States and Canada, the risk of a costly over-reaction posed by the
lack of understanding regarding acid rain must be weighed against
the potential costs of further delay.75
Observers of Canadian acid rain project a fifteen to twenty-year
scenario during which substantial areas of the wilderness would be
irreversibly damaged if acidification were allowed to continue un-
abated e.7  Affected provinces in Canada have already enacted a
number of single-source abatement programs to be completed
within ten years." As of 1980, an Acid Precipitation Task Force
was created in the United States with directions to commence a
ten-year study program with annual reports to the President,78 and
the only proposed legislation which has focused on the problem
has also set a ten-year completion date.79 If actually put into effect,
7' Provisions governing information exchange are contained in section 2 of the Third Re-
port's Schematic Outline. When a dangerous situation comes to light, "the acting State has
a duty to provide the affected State with all relevant and available information," except for
that withheld "for reasons of national or industrial security." Int'l L. Comm'n 34th Session,
supra note 26, para. 109, §§ 2(1), 2(3), at 180.
73 Int'l L. Comm'n 32nd Session, supra note 11, para. 137, at 365.
7 This inquiry could point to the need for a source country to conduct its affairs accord-
ing to an assumed worst possible case scenario, pending a more complete understanding of
the danger posed. The standard of due care may require that a source country maintain a
state of preparedness, ensuring that the most drastic control option remains a feasible alter-
native, rather than waiting until a time when the actual need for the drastic option can be
proven or disproven, by which time irreparable damage may have rendered the question
moot.
71 The ILC has noted that one of the guiding principles of the topic is "a standard of care
commensurate with the nature of the danger." Int'l L. Comm'n 32nd Session, supra note 11,
para. 137, at 365.
" Wetstone, supra note 57, at 50,002; [4 Current Report] INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 9,
at 1008-09 (Sept. 9, 1981) (comments of Canadian External Affairs Minister).
77 See Canadian Embassy, Aide Memoire, (Mar. 6, 1981) (copy available in Georgia Jour-
nal of International and Comparative Law Offices) [hereinafter cited as Canadian Em-
bassy, Aide Memoire].
'$ 42 U.S.C. § 8902 (Supp. IV 1980); see also [5 Current Report] INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA)
No. 8, at 323-24 (Aug. 11, 1982) (implementation of 10 year study).
Senate Bill 1706, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 11,117 (1981) would halt sulfur
emissions at 1981 levels over the eastern United States. Senate Bill 1709, 97th Cong., 1st
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a ten-year abatement program would seem to be a reasonable com-
promise between costly control measures and the cumulative
threat of harm. On the other hand, a ten-year study program,
without any other interim measures, might be assessed at the end
of the decade as a violation of the duty of due care. 0 It should be
noted that damage projections and abatement deadlines, and the
question of available reaction time in general, suffer from the same
uncertainty which pervades initial attempts to delineate the stan-
dards of conduct mandated by the primary obligation.
The necessity of calculating available reaction time falls within
the scope of a broader obligation borne by each country to work
towards a mutually acceptable set of assumptions upon which to
base further negotiations."' In this respect, the United States and
Canada in 1978 formed a joint Research Consultation Group to lay
out a factual basis for further negotiations in response to mounting
concern in the scientific community over acid rain."2 The second
report of the Research Consultation Group confirms that the
threat appears to be serious and that the flow of pollution is
largely in a single direction.8 ' This finding supplied the basis for
Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 11,153 (1981) would put a similar cap on sulfur emissions nationwide.
See [4 Current Report] INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 1075-76 (Nov. 11, 1981).
60 The extent of a duty of prevention under international liability would be more difficult
to define when the harmful nature of the activity only came to light after many years of
conducting the activity under the assumption of its harmlessness. In such a situation, main-
taining the status quo is more similar to passive conduct, and therefore, arguably is less
reprehensible. With respect to an even more extreme situation, Mr. Quentin-Baxter queries:
"[sihould 'activity' also include a lack of activity to remove a natural danger which ... may
give rise to loss ... ?" Int'l L. Comm'n 34th Session, supra note 26, para. 109, § 1(2), at 180.
s8 This concept illustrates the manner in which a firmly established obligation may give
rise to a subsidiary obligation which attaches at an earlier point in the sequence of events.
The duty to work towards mutual assumptions arises out of the duty to negotiate in good
faith, which in turn arises out of the duty to fulfill one's contractual obligations. See, e.g.,
Int'l L. Comm'n 34th Session, supra note 26, para. 109, § 4(1), at 182; W. GORMLEY, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT 232 (1976); Stockholm Declaration, supra note 8, at 1420-21
(Principle 24); see also Int'l L. Comm'n 34th Session, supra note 26, para. 116, at 188, where
it is suggested that the balance of interests test exists primarily "as an aid to interested
States in pursuance of their duty to negotiate in good faith."
When the established obligation is pursued within the context of due diligence, the sub-
sidiary obligation arises in order to prevent the established obligation from being thwarted
in its essential purpose. "The topic [in the Report on International Liability] is founded in
the substantive obligation to develop the law by making the existing law work." Second
Report: Chapter 4, supra note 27, para. 82, at 7.
"' See generally Research Consultation Group Report, supra note 15.
'3 "Transboundary pollution is serious, and deposition in eastern Canada originates about
equally from Canada and the United States, whereas the bulk of sulfur deposition in the
United States originates there." Id. at 1.
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more extensive bilateral investigation.
In 1979, the two governments issued a Joint Statement which
outlined the "substantial basis of obligation, commitment and co-
operative practice in existing environmental relations."' 4 This in-
cludes a number of government-level settlements of past environ-
mental disputes"5 and mutual support of principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration, although, significantly, principle 22 (refer-
ring to compensatory liability) was not mentioned. In defining this
pre-existing basis, the Joint Statement was considered a necessary
first step towards tailoring an agreement to the present dispute.86
The second step, in the form of a Memorandum of Intent, was
completed in 1980.87 The Memorandum asserts the mutual intent
of the two countries to "develop a bilateral agreement which will
reflect and further the development of . . . measures to combat
transboundary air pollution,"88 and pending formation of this
agreement, to take available interim actions.8 9 In order to speed
the attainment of both objectives, it outlines the structure of five
Work Groups, each of which is to clarify a particular aspect of the
" External Affairs Canada, Joint Statement on Transboundary Air Quality, United
States-Canada (July 26, 1979) (Communiqu6) [hereinafter cited as Canadian Embassy
Communiqu4].
E.g., Treaty on Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11,
1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548; Agreement on Great Lakes
Water Quality, Apr. 15, 1972, United States-Canada, 23 U.S.T. 301, T.I.A.S. No. 7312;
Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, 1978, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30
U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257.
Preface to Canadian Embassy Communique, supra note 84.
'Memorandum of Intent concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, United
States-Canada, reprinted in [3 Current Report] INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 391 (Aug.
13, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Intent).
The agreement process has consisted of a series of steps towards stronger mutual commit-
ment, from Joint Statement to Memorandum of Intent, aiming for an eventual binding
agreement. In a similar vein, a bifurcated agreement has been suggested. Wetstone, supra
note 57, at 50,019. The agreement might be modeled after the United States-Canadian
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1972 and 1978. See supra note 85. Within this
framework, a preliminary regime would impose such control measures as were currently fea-
sible, and a more comprehensive program would be enacted following an extended study
period. Wetstone, supra note 57, at 50,019, suggests an initial focus on the better under-
stood sulfur deposition process, with a nitrogen reduction program to be devised at a later
time.
On the other hand, a division between amelioration of damage in the first agreement and
prevention in the second, as has been suggested in other environmental contexts, would be
less appropriate with acid rain since damage is largely non-ameliorable. See J. SCHNEIDER,
supra note 45, at 154.
Memorandum of Intent, supra note 87, at 392.
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United States-Canada transfrontier pollution problem. 0
The Memorandum contains a skeletal outline of the primary ob-
ligation as currently perceived: to continue to seek a better under-
standing of the problem, to take such interim measures as due dili-
gence would require, and to work towards an agreement with
respect to the future."1 Perceptions of what interim measures are
appropriate may vary considerably, however, between an affected
country and a source country. Canada, as previously noted, 92 has
taken significant steps to reduce sulfur emissions, while the United
States has been more inclined to wait until all the facts are
known. 3 Canada's more favorable disposition towards the use of
interim measures results in part from the greater ease with which
they can be effected in a nation where emission controls have been
more lenient in the past, 4 and where much pollution comes from
large individual sources.95 Some critics have charged that the more
cautious attitude of the United States towards interim steps indi-
cates a disposition to preserve the status quo, which would be eco-
nomically advantageous to a source country." This tension be-
tween dilatory conduct and what may be a legitimate concern for
clarification, highlights the current need to formulate primary
rules of obligation concerning acts which are beyond the reach of
conventional international legal doctrine-acts which are "not pro-
hibited" but in need of control.
Observers suggest that the agreement between the United States
" Id. at 392-93.
"1 See supra notes 83-85.
" See supra note 72.
"' See [5 Current Report] IN'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 312-13 (Aug. 11, 1982) (Office
of Technology Assessment Report); [5 Current Report] INr'L ENv'T REP. (BNA) No. 10, at
445-46 (Oct. 13, 1982) (EPA chief statement).
" See Environmental Mediation International, The Use of Section 115 of the Clean Air
Act to Control Long Range Transport of Air Pollution Between the United States and Ca-
nada, 22 (n.d.) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Mediation Report]; Wetstone, supra
note 57, at 50,012.
"[Nion-ferrous smelting currently accounts for about 45 percent of Canada's sulfur
emissions." Wetstone, supra note 57, at 50,012.
" "A new strategy ... based, very simply, on the demonstrable imperfection of the sci-
entific data base ... proposes that, in the absence of some unspecified and therefore easily
adjustable degree of scientific precision .... all the risks and all the costs of long range
pollution damage must be borne by the recipients." Statement by G. Rejhon, Environment
Counsellor, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., to the National Conference of State Leg-
islatures (July 27, 1981) (copy available in Georgia Journal of International and Compara-
tive Law Offices); see also [5 Current Report] INT'L EN"T REP. (BNA) No. 7, at 280-81 (July
14, 1982) (Canadian accusations of intentional delays by United States officials in acid rain
negotiations).
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and Canada is likely to consist of a set of mutually acceptable
principles which will leave substantial discretion to the national
and constituent agencies charged with their execution. 7 The prob-
able format is the result, first, of the federal nature of each govern-
ment"' and second, of the awkwardness of using costly and ill-de-
fined control measures as bargaining chips."s Some commentators
fear that an agreement whose terms are limited to generalities will
be ineffective to spur efforts to solve the acid rain problem. 00 This
view depends on the questionable assumption that the legal au-
thority of the pact would be the only factor pushing the parties
towards abatement measures. Actually, it seems probable that the
same force which pushes countries towards an agreement would
push them towards abatement measures in the absence of an
agreement containing detailed provisions.
B. The Duty of Abatement
The search for an agreement allocating preventive or compensa-
tory measures must begin with a mutual acceptance of the essen-
tial equality of interests between source and affected countries.' 1
This represents the first step in meeting the obligation to negotiate
in good faith.10 2 Legal theory postulates the existence of an ideal
compromise point at which all interests are balanced between the
result of no abatement on one hand, and of total abatement on the
other. Canada's contribution to its own acid rain problems repre-
sents a flaw in the source-receptor relationship and complicates the
operation of the formula. Nevertheless, it can be asserted that the
major factor, which would determine the amount of pollution
abatement required of a source country, is the proportion of that
country's contribution to the whole problem and the costs of
abatement weighed against any benefit derived by the source coun-
7 Wetstone, supra note 57, at 50,019.
" See Environmental Mediation Report, supra note 94, at 21-25; Wetstone, supra note
57, at 50,003-11.
" See Wetstone, supra note 57, at 50,019; [4 Current Report] INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA)
No. 10, at 1040 (Oct. 14, 1981) (comments of Senator Brown); Munton, supra note 4, at 25
(comments of C. Bourne, attorney).
1 0 "[T]he important question is not whether there will be an agreement, but whether it
will be a tough and effective one, or essentially a promissory note. The signs are not good."
The Crisis of Acid Rain, INT'L PERSPECTIVES, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 9.
101 Preliminary Report: Chapter 4, supra note 1, para. 57, at 3. The matter of protective
measures and that of compensatory measures will be dealt with separately in this Note. In
practice, however, the two matters would probably be woven into a single agreement.
o' See supra note 80.
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try at home.10 3 The focus of the inquiry must always be on "the
minimum [restriction on the source country's freedom] needed to
ensure the redress and abatement of the injury.'101
The primary obstacle will be conflicting opinions concerning
"the delimitation of sovereign interests." 105 The Report on Inter-
national Liability points out that no rule of thumb can adequately
deal with the "variable concept of harm. ' '106 While damage to an
ecosystem is always difficult to quantify,10 7 Canada's interests in
agriculture, forestry, and tourism,108 all of which are directly de-
pendent on the natural environment, may make that country more
inclined to seek protection despite the difficulty in measuring the
value of the protected resources. Incidentally related factors, such
as the potential conflict between a pollution abatement program
and the emphasis of the United States on converting oil-fired
power plants to coal,109 may also have to be accommodated. In the
long view, however, Mr. Quentin-Baxter cautions that this duty "to
have regard to all interests that may be affected"110 must be cir-
cumscribed by the necessity "to negotiate . . . with a view to arriv-
ing at an agreement."1
A related obstacle to the balancing of interests will be the differ-
ing capacities of the two countries to effect preventive measures.
The marginal cost of reduction in acid deposition may be lower in
Canada than in the United States because of the more concen-
o3 See Preliminary Report: Chapter 4, supra note 1, para. 60, at 5.
Section 5 of the Schematic Outline lists the four major principles to be accommodated: (1)
freedom of choice for source countries, (2) balanced by adequate protection for affected
countries, (3) not leaving innocent victims to bear the loss while taking into consideration
hardships on either side in allocating costs, and (4) inferences of fact against the source
country on questions upon which it has withheld information. Int'l L. Comm'n 34th Session,
supra note 26, at 182-83. Section 6 lists other specific factors which could be useful in a
"balancing of interests." See id. at 183-84.
I" Preliminary Report: Chapter 4, supra note 1, para. 60, at 5.
106 Preliminary Report: Chapter 3, para. 39, at 7. See also Stockholm Declaration, supra
note 8, at 1420 (Principle 23). Principle 23's focus on the contrast in interests between in-
dustrial and less-developed States is reflected to some extent on a regional scale in the
United States-Canadian conflict.
Preliminary Report: Chapter 3, supra note 1, para. 38, at 6.
107 "One of the major problems in assessing environmental damage caused by acidification
is the lack of reference." I. VAN LIER, supra note 63, at 39.
'" [4 Current Report] INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 1039 (Oct. 14, 1980) (comments
of John Roberts, Minister of Environment, Canada).
"' See [3 Current Report) INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 320-21 (Aug. 13, 1980) (com-
ments of EPA Chief Costle).
1 Preliminary Report: Chapter 3, supra note 1, para. 46, at 11.
. Id. para. 40, at 7 (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 47).
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trated nature of emission sources in Canada and the shorter dis-
tances of transport involved.11 On the other hand, the Canadian
central government's greater reliance on the provinces in carrying
out its programs may lessen that government's ability to deliver
ironclad guarantees.1
Observers in the affected country may disagree with the proposi-
tion that conduct in that country should have any effect on the
source country's obligation to cease transporting pollutants across
the border. This disagreement illustrates the central problem in
creating a workable regime based on principles of international lia-
bility. Like other types of harm arising out of acts "not prohib-
ited," the transfrontier export of pollutants occurs by fault of
neither country, and consequently, any assessment of individual li-
ability appears unjustified.1 4 The only response to this disagree-
ment is to point out that under some circumstances, a party may
act without fault and still be expected justifiably to account for
certain consequences.
Accordingly, legal critics have suggested various relationships
between the pollution control standards within an affected country
and the standards that are to be expected from a source country. " 5
A number of observers have expressed the hope that Canada's
abatement measures may serve as a model for determining what
.. See supra notes 94-95.
"3 Environmental Mediation Report, supra note 94, at 21-29. In practice, Canada's fed-
eral system has never prevented the government from settling transfrontier pollution dis-
putes with the United States. In the present dispute, Ontario and Quebec, the most seri-
ously affected provinces, are active participants in the settlement seeking process. See
Canadian Embassy, Aide Memoire, supra note 77.
"4 See, e.g., [4 Current Report] Ir'L ENv'T REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 1075-76 (Nov. 11,
1981) (industry testimony before Senate panel); Editorial, Canada's Acid Rain, Pittsburgh
Press, Nov. 9, 1981, at -, col. -.
'" "[S]tandards of protection should take into account. . . the standards applied in the
affected State." Int'l L. Comm'n 34th Session, supra note 26, para. 109, § 5(3), at 182-83.
In a report to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), one
commentator suggests that "[n]o State .. . can claim a better protection against trans-
frontier pollution than the one it provides under its own laws against pollution of national
origin." Bothe, International Legal Problems of Industrial Siting in Border Areas and Na-
tional Environmental Policies, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION AND THE ROLE OF STATE 79 (1981).
On the other hand, it has been suggested that a country should not have to regulate trans-
frontier pollution to any greater degree than it regulates domestic pollution. Manner, Water
Pollution in International Law, in II Conference on Water Pollution Problems in Europe
446, 464, U.N. Sales No. 61.II.E/Mim.24 (1961). These two standards are not necessarily
inconsistent.
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United States measures are justified.11.6 Reliance upon such a com-
parison, however, would have to be tempered with an awareness of
the varying costs of abatement in the two countries.' 17
Conversely, a source country may condition its protective mea-
sures on guarantees of reciprocal protection by the affected coun-
try."1 The right to such reciprocal protection, like any other inci-
dent of sovereign equality, could hardly be denied. Nevertheless, a
country's obligations under the concept of international liability
attach solely as a result of potentially injurious activity, and are
not dependent on the existence of a contractual agreement. Ques-
tions of reciprocity are raised more appropriately where each coun-
try's conduct poses a danger to the other. A source country's insis-
tence on authoritative guarantees of reciprocal protection could be
justified only to the extent that such measures appear likely to be
required in the future.
C. The Duty of Compensation
With a transfrontier pollution problem of the current magni-
tude, it appears unlikely that the full array of control measures
which may be mandated by the duty of due diligence will eliminate
all future United States responsibility for acid rain in Canada. Any
future damage, along with damage caused by the United States
brought about before formulation of a control regime, will be the
concern of the most poorly defined responsibility in the Report on
International Liability: the duty of compensation. In this respect,
the Report outlines a pervasive "equitable principle,"11 9 most eas-
ily recognized in cases of damage occurring in circumstances pre-
cluding wrongfulness; 20 an innocent party suffering injury should
lie See Canadian Embassy, Aide Memoire, supra note 77, at 1.
See supra notes 94-95.
18 See section 115 of the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (Supp. IV 1980), which
empowers the Environmental Protection Agency to take actions to reduce tranafrontier pol-
lution on the condition that the other country provide "essentially the same rights" to the
United States. Some commentary has focused on whether this requirement could prove to
be an obstacle to United States abatement measures in view of the Canadian government's
inability to speak for its constituent units with the same degree of assurance enjoyed by the
United States government. See generally Environmental Mediation Report, supra note 94.
It seems unlikely that this reciprocity requirement would obstruct United States measures,
since section 115 is only the most visible of many possible avenues of response. The primary
obligation attaches regardless of the availability of the legislative tools of compliance. For an
analysis of section 115, see Note, Acid Rain, Canada and the United States: Enforcing the
International Pollution Provision of the Clean Air Act, 1 B. U. Irr'L L.J. 151 (1982).
Preliminary Report: Chapter 3, supra note 1, paras. 46-47, at 11-12.
See id. para. 47, at 11.
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not be left to bear the loss alone, regardless of the injuring party's
lack of fault."' 1 This principle of protecting the passively innocent
party may give rise to an obligation to compensate that party. This
duty may arise either as a result of that harm which has occurred
before the countries involved were able to reach an agreement, or
that harm which reasonable abatement measures fail to prevent in
the future. 22
In the simplest case, the Report on International Liability envi-
sions a compensatory regime that fills the gap between reasonable
control measures and unprevented harm.12 3 It is suggested, how-
ever, that "depending on the actual circumstances and the ele-
ments of common disaster, it may be more equitable that the loss
should be shared or lie where it falls."'' " Nevertheless, it would be
conceivable for compensation to play a reverse gap-filling role. For
instance, in a case where the source country's cost of compliance is
extremely high, and the affected country's need for abatement is
compelling enough to justify that expenditure, the source country
might be justified in expecting the affected country to share the
burden. Since a source country's duty to take protective measures
attaches regardless of that country's fault, the cost of complying
with this duty could be viewed, to some extent, as a cost arising
out of the relationship between the two countries, rather than aris-
ing out of the source country's conduct alone.
As with the burden of protection, the determination of where the
compensatory burden should fall would be the product of good
faith negotiations towards a balance of interests, founded on an
acceptance of the fundamental equality of those interests. The ex-
tent to which an injured party has engaged itself in the potentially
injurious activity has been a factor in formulations of strict liabil-
ity by national legal systems;' 25 however, in the present context,
such activity could only be relevant to the extent that it were con-
tinued after the risk became known.
"I Cf. RESTATEmrNT (S.coND) OF ToRTS § 515(3) (1977) (assumption of the risk as de-
fense to strict liability).
I A division between pre-agreement and post-agreement harm will, in the present con-
text, be difficult to draw since executing an abatement program will be a lengthy process.
From an equitable standpoint, it is not clear which kind of harm would be more deserving of
compensation. The chief basis for a distinction lies in the fact that blame for pre-agreement
damage is excused by ignorance, while post-agreement damage is justified by a balancing of
costs and equities.
"" Preliminary Report: Chapter 4, supra note 1, para. 59, at 5.
124 Id.
U See W. PaossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 522-24 (4th ed. 1971).
[Vol. 13:111
INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY-ACID RAIN
According to the Third Report on International Liability, a duty
of reparation, unlike a duty of abatement, would have to satisfy
the slightly more exacting procedural standard of falling within the
"shared expectations" of the two countries." 6 As an example of
this duty, the ILC gives the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion Convention of the Economic Commission for Europe,1 27 which,
in a footnote, disclaims questions of compensation, thereby remov-
ing that remedy from the "shared expectations" of the signatory
nations expressed in the Convention." 8
As noted above," 9 much of the value of the Report on Interna-
tional Liability as a tool for dealing with transfrontier pollution
arises out of its flexibility. The interaction between protective and
compensatory measures creates room for maneuvering between ne-
gotiating parties. The compensatory balance is pushed in one di-
rection or the other in response to particular contrasts in the orien-
tation of the parties with respect to the protective regime. For
example, if based on an objective balancing of interests, it were
determined that the affected country was entitled to a particular
degree of abatement, then that country might arrange to compen-
sate the source country for additional abatement in the event it
desired a higher standard of environmental protection.
Under different circumstances, the notion of "quasi-wrongs, '" 30
within the broad scope of "acts not prohibited," might provide a
useful conceptual foothold in a balancing of the equities. A country
which has engaged in certain activities which are not prohibited
but nevertheless arguably are reprehensible, such as delay tactics
or abuse of emission dispersion techniques, might find itself in the
weaker equitable position when compensatory duties are deline-
ated. The use of the concept of quasi-wrongs most likely would
find a place in a regime of future conduct, where no country faced
the immediate threat of having its conduct so labeled, and espe-
cially in a multi-lateral format where this threat would be even
more remote to an individual country. The reluctance of countries
to subject themselves to accusations of wrongful conduct, however,
... Int'l L. Comm'n 34th Session, supra note 26, para. 109, § 4(2), at 182.
See supra note 8.
Int'l L. Comm'n 34th Session, supra note 26, para. 119, at 188-89.
See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
IO This concept is to be distinguished from the related civil law notion of "quasi-delicts."
A quasi-delict is a basis for the assessment of vicarious liability;, quasi-wrongs, as suggested
here, concern conduct of the party against whom liability is to be assessed. See W. BucK-
LAND & A. McNAm, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAw 311 (rev. 2d ed. 1952).
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which supplies much of the force behind the international liability
concept,"' would make quasi-wrongs an unlikely tool for a bilat-
eral situation, or for. circumstances where damage already has
occurred.
In light of contemporary legal realities, an attempt to balance all
the equities between the United States and Canada in pursuit of
an ideal regime of compensation would appear to be a useless exer-
cise. The ILC has noted that countries have been reluctant to ac-
cept a direct linkage between preventive obligations and compen-
sation.1"2 The United States and Canada, despite their history of
effective dispute settlement,133 are not likely to agree to such a
linkage with regard to the current dilemma. The expense of envi-
ronmental controls on either side threatens to reach significant
levels.1 " Moreover, an agreement to compensate might be seen as
carrying the taint of an admission of wrongfulness which would not
be present in an agreement to take future preventive measures.
Recognition of a compensatory obligation is more likely to make its
appearance in a settlement where injurious conduct can be com-
pletely halted, or in a regime governing only future events, where
countries perceive a reasonable opportunity to avoid triggering the
compensatory obligation.
IV. CONCLUSION
While large scale acceptance of compensatory liability appears to
be relegated to the future, the more passive duties of consultation
and prevention are becoming established rules of customary law.
In the final analysis, primary rules of obligation within the Report
's' See supra note 38.
See supra text accompanying note 11.
See, e.g., Treaty on Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada, supra
note 85; Agreements on Great Lakes Water Quality, supra note 85; Trail Smelter Arbitra-
tion, supra note 8; see also Environmental Mediation Report, supra note 94, at 30-37 (his-
tory of less publicized disputes).
" See supra note 98. The Trail Smelter Case, which appeared to acknowledge an abso-
lute duty to compensate for damage to land, is distinguished by its comparatively small cost
scale, and by the traceability of the harm to a single identifiable source. See generally Read,
supra note 14, at 213, 219-21.
On the other side of the scale, an OECD study of the damage caused by sulfur emissions
in Europe, which did not attempt to include a calculation of human health effects, found
that emission reductions could result in significant savings in property value, exceeding the
costs of abatement. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Costs
and Benefits of Sulfur Oxide Control: A Methodological Study (1981), quoted in SUB-COu-
MITTUE ON ACID RAIN OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FiSHERIES AND FoREsTRY, STILL WA-
TERs: THi CHILLING REALrY OF ACID RAIN 112 (1980).
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on International Liability neither restrict nor expand state sover-
eignty, but instead modify the concept at its outer fringes, where
one body of sovereign rights impinges on another. "[Tjhe true free-
dom of each national community depend[s] on preserving a bal-
ance between over-restriction of beneficial activities which might
have harmful transboundary consequences, and over-exposure to
such consequences when produced within other States.' 135 This ex-
change of restrictions on conduct for rights to protection will bring
about a greater degree of interdependence between countries. 3 6
Upon the initial attachment of a primary obligation, that obliga-
tion will be characterized by uncertainty as a result of varying per-
ceptions of legal duties, as well as a result of poor scientific under-
standing of the danger. From the inception of the new relationship,
this obligation will be addressed to resolving uncertainty and to
bringing conflicting views into focus within an agreement. To this
end, the primary obligation of a source country undergoes a step-
by-step evolution, each step determining the need for, and extent
of, the next step, from the initial exchange of information through
the final protective-compensatory regime.
Principles of international liability, then, function as a diffuse
standard of tort liability.3 7 Rather than calling for the use of tort
remedies, however, the Report on International Liability merely
calls for the exchange of information and good faith negotiations
towards an agreement concerning the use of remedies. Neverthe-
less, if concepts such as "good faith" are to have any meaning in
international law, then the chain of events set in motion by the
inception of a "new legal relationship" between countries eventu-
ally will have to culminate in a binding agreement mandating some
combination of protection and compensation.
The pervasive use of the word "obligation" in the ILC's outline
of the topic raises questions as to the legal force underlying these
principles. Due largely to the absence of any means of enforce-
ment, the Report on International Liability, like a number of other
international declarations of principle, has been framed in general
and loosely defined terms. Similarly, the dimensions of the primary
obligation itself are as yet ill-defined, because of the paucity of le-
Int'l L. Comm'n 33rd Session, supra note 28, para. 167, at 338.
13 Int'l L. Comm'n 32nd Session, supra note 11, para. 142, at 366-67.
137 However, the agreement towards which countries are directed by the Report on Inter-
national Liability is, obviously, governed by principles which are analogous to contract
liability.
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gal precedents. Nevertheless, as more comprehensive systems of
obligation evolve between countries, contributing to the growth of
an international consensus concerning transfrontier pollution, the
primary obligation on countries which are sources of such pollution
will become more sharply defined and, as a result, be supported by
greater legal force in the eyes of the international community.
John B. Lyle
